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Abstract
This paper extends the Cournot and Bertrand models of strategic interac-
tion between firms by assuming that managers are not only profit maximizers,
but also have preferences for reciprocity or are averse to inequity. A reciprocal
manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions, while at the
same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions. An inequity
averse manager likes to reduce the diﬀerence between own profits and the ri-
vals’ profits. The paper finds that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à
la Cournot, then they may be able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a con-
structive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare may emerge
under a destructive reciprocity equilibrium. If there is Cournot competition be-
tween firms and their managers are averse to advantageous (disadvantageous)
inequity, then firms are better (worse) oﬀ than if managers only care about max-
imizing profits. If firms compete à la Bertrand, then only under very restrictive
conditions will managers’ preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion have
an impact on equilibrium outcomes.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D63, L13, L21.
Keywords: Reciprocity; Inequity Aversion; Cournot; Bertrand.
†I am thankful to Joel Sobel for many helpful comments. I am also thankful for com-
ments made by participants at the 2006 Meetings of European Economic Association.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from an INOVA grant.
1
1 Introduction
The assumption that individuals behave as if maximizing their material payoﬀs,
despite its central role in economic analysis, is at odds with a large body of
evidence from psychology and from experimental economics. Economic agents
often pursue objectives other than actual payoﬀ maximization. Many observed
departures from material payoﬀ maximizing behavior arise through actions that
favor fairness or reciprocity, or that show concern for relative payoﬀs.
Motivated by this evidence, this paper studies strategic interactions between
firms whose managers not only care about maximizing profits, but also care
about the intentions of their rivals or the distribution of profits across firms. The
analyzes focuses on the two canonical models of strategic interaction: Cournot
and Bertrand competition. I study the economic implications for market output,
price, profits and consumer surplus of having managers with these types of
preferences making decisions in firms.
The paper starts by incorporating preferences for reciprocity into the Cournot
model of quantity competition. I assume that a reciprocal manager cares about
maximizing profits but also about the intentions of his rivals. If a reciprocal
manager expects his rivals to produce more output than his own perception of
their fair output, then he is willing to sacrifice some of his firm’s profits to re-
duce the rivals’ profits. By contrast, if a reciprocal manager expects the output
of his rivals to fall short of his own perception of their fair output, then he is
willing to sacrifice some of his firm’s profits to increase his rivals’ profits.
I find that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à la Cournot and the
managers think that the fair output of their rivals is greater than the equilibrium
output the rivals would produce if they only cared about maximizing profits,
then firms attain a constructive reciprocity equilibrium. In such an equilibrium
firms produce less than they would produce if their managers only cared about
maximizing profits. This happens because a reciprocal manager wishes to re-
ward his rivals for producing less than his perception of what the fair output of
his rivals is. The reciprocal manager does that by reducing firm output.
Taking the perspective of an outside observer who is ignorant about man-
agers’ preferences for reciprocity, a constructive reciprocity equilibrium is in-
distinguishable from a “collusive” outcome.1 Thus, a constructive reciprocity
equilibrium is good for firms since it leads to higher profits than the profits of
firms with managers who only care about maximizing profits and in addition
it provides managers payoﬀ gains from being treated kindly. A constructive
reciprocity equilibrium is bad for consumers since it reduces quantity and raises
market price.
However, if firms with reciprocal managers compete à la Cournot and their
managers think that the fair output of their rivals is smaller than the equilibrium
output the rivals would produce if they only cared about maximizing profits,
then firms end up in a destructive reciprocity equilibrium. In such an equilibrium
1Throughout the paper I consider that collusive outcomes describe situations where firms
produce less than the Cournot-Nash quantities of firms whose managers only care about
maximizing profits.
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firms produce more than they would produce if their managers only cared about
maximizing profits. This happens because a reciprocal manager wishes to punish
his rivals for producing more than his perception of what the fair output of his
rivals is. The reciprocal manager does that by increasing firm output.
A destructive reciprocity equilibrium is bad for firms since it leads to lower
profits than the profits of firms with managers who only care about maximizing
profits and in addition it makes managers incur payoﬀ loses from being treated
unkindly. This equilibrium is good for consumers since it increases quantity and
reduces market price. If one ignores managers’ preferences for reciprocity, a de-
structive reciprocity equilibrium is indistinguishable from Stackelberg warfare.2
The paper proceeds by studying the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot
competition. I assume that an inequity averse manager cares about maximizing
profits and, in addition, likes to reduce the diﬀerence between his firm’s profits
and the rivals’ profits. More specifically, such a manager is assumed to feel
compassion towards his rivals (aversion to advantageous inequity) when the
average profits of his rivals are smaller than his firm’s profits and envy towards
his rivals (aversion to disadvantageous inequity) when the average profits of his
rivals are greater than his firm’s profits.
The paper shows that the set of Nash equilibria of Cournot competition
between firms with inequity averse managers changes monotonically with com-
passion and envy. If there is quantity competition and managers’ degree of envy
increases, then the largest Nash equilibria of the Cournot game moves closer to
the perfectly competitive outcome.3 By contrast, if there is quantity compe-
tition and managers’ degree of compassion increases, then the smallest Nash
equilibria of the Cournot game moves closer to the best collusive outcome.
I also find that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) piecewise linear specification of
inequity aversion can change the strategic interaction between firms’ choice vari-
ables in Cournot competition: quantities become strategic complements over
intermediate output levels. I show that this gives rise to a continuum of equi-
libria. However, as the number of firms grows the impact of piecewise inequity
aversion on the set of Nash equilibria vanishes.
Finally, the paper shows that only under very restrictive conditions will
preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand
competition. For example, when two firms with inequity averse managers engage
in Bertrand competition and marginal costs are constant, only if both managers
are willing to give up more than one dollar of their profit to raise the average
profit of their opponents by a dollar, can there be an equilibrium where price is
above marginal cost.
This paper is related to a recent strand of literature in economics that studies
the consequences of relaxing the assumption of individual greed.4 The paper is
2 I consider that Stackelberg warfare describes situations where firms produce more than
the Cournot-Nash outputs of firms whose managers only care about maximizing profits.
3A similar result has also been found in a diﬀerent context. Demougin and Fluet (2003)
show that in a rank order tournament the principal is better oﬀ when agents are envious than
when they are compassionate.
4Rabin (1993) introduces fairness considerations into game theory. Englmaier and
3
also related to literature in industrial organization that analyzes how firms will
choose prices and product characteristics when managers have certain behavioral
biases. An example is Al-Najjar et al. (2006) work on the pricing decision of
firms whose managers confound fixed, sunk and variable costs.
The impact of interdependent preferences on strategic interactions between
firms in imperfectly competitive markets has not received much attention. The
only exception is Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) who find that their model of
inequity aversion has no impact on Cournot and Bertrand competition. In this
paper I find that both preferences for reciprocity as well as inequity aversion can
change the outcome of Cournot competition. These findings stand in contrast
to those in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).5
Several papers have explored the implications of interdependent preferences
in perfectly competitive markets. For example, Segal and Sobel (2004) show
that interdependent preferences have no impact on equilibria of auction-style
environments.6 In this paper I show that only under very restrictive condi-
tions do preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion change the outcome of
Bertrand competition. This is consistent with previous literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses ways of modeling reci-
procity and inequity aversion. Section 3 studies Cournot competition between
reciprocal managers. Section 4 studies Cournot competition between inequity
averse managers. Section 5 studies Bertrand price competition with recipro-
cal and inequity averse managers. Section 6 discusses how inequity aversion
can explain behavior in experimental endogenous timing games and how pref-
erences for reciprocity can facilitate collusion in dynamic oligopolies. Section 7
concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Interdependent Preferences
Many experiments show that individuals are willing to incur losses to punish
those who treat them unkindly or to reward those who treat them kindly. This
type of behavior is called preferences for reciprocity.7 A person with this type
of preferences cares about the intentions behind the actions of their opponents
but is not bothered by unfair payoﬀ distributions. Experiments also find that
many individuals are willing to give up some material payoﬀ to move in the
direction of more equitable distributions of payoﬀs. This type of behavior is
Wambach (2002) study optimal contracts when the agent suﬀers from being better oﬀ or
worse oﬀ than the principal. Biel (2003) studies how the optimal incentive contract in team
production is aﬀected when workers are averse to inequity. Sappington (2004) studies inequity
aversion in adverse selection contexts.
5 Section 5 compares the findings in the two papers.
6Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show how the competitive
prediction of the ultimatum game with many proposers and one responder studied by Pras-
nikar and Roth (1992) continues to hold under the assumption that some individuals in the
population care about inequity aversion.
7Preferences for reciprocity are also called preferences for process or intentions based fair-
ness.
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called inequity aversion.8
Preferences for reciprocity were first modeled in the economics literature
by Rabin (1993) using the theory of psychological games of Geanakoplos et al.
(1989). In Rabin’s model the weight a firm places on a rival’s monetary profits
depends on the interpretation of that rival’s intentions which are evaluated using
beliefs (and beliefs about beliefs) over strategy choices. This approach provides
a model of preferences for reciprocity since a firm places a positive weight on
a rivals’ profit when the firm thinks that the behavior of the rival is nice and
negative if it thinks that the behavior is nasty.
Inequity aversion theories assume that individuals are concerned about their
own material payoﬀ but also the consequences of their acts on payoﬀ distribu-
tions. An inequity averse person cares about the distribution of payoﬀs but it
does not care about the intentions that lead others to choose certain actions.
There are two main theories of inequity aversion: Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). According to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999)
model a player cares about his own payoﬀ and dislikes absolute payoﬀ diﬀer-
ences between his own payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of any other player.9 According
to Bolton and Ockenfels’s (2000) “Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competi-
tion” (henceforth ERC) a player is concerned with both his own payoﬀ and his
relative share of the total group payoﬀ.10
Preferences for reciprocity and inequity aversion have been shown to explain
behavior in bargaining games and in trust games.11 For example, in ultimatum
games oﬀers are usually much more generous than predicted by equilibrium and
low oﬀers are often rejected. These oﬀers are consistent with an equilibrium
in which players make oﬀers knowing that other players may reject allocations
that appear unfair.12
Segal and Sobel (1999) provide an axiomatic foundation for interdependent
preferences that can reflect reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism as well spite-
fulness.13 They assume that in addition to conventional preferences over out-
comes, players in a strategic environment also have preferences over strategy
profiles. Their representation theorem shows that the payoﬀ function of a firm
8 Inequity aversion is sometimes called preference for outcome based fairness.
9Neilson (2000) provides an axiomatic characterization of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model of inequity aversion.
10According to ERC, a player would be equally happy if all players received the same payoﬀ
or if some were rich and some were poor as long as he received the average payoﬀ, while
according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) he would clearly prefer that all players get the same.
11Camerer (2003) and Sobel (2005) provide excellent reviews of this literature.
12 Sobel (2005) argues convincingly that models of interdependent preferences such as reci-
procity can provide clearer and more intuitive explanations of interesting economic phenom-
ena.
13 Some individuals also display altruism and others spitefulness. An altruistic person is
willing to increase the payoﬀ of his opponents at a personal cost to himself, irrespective of
the payoﬀ distribution and irrespective of the behavior of the opponents. A spiteful person
is willing to decrease the payoﬀ of his opponents at a personal cost to himself, irrespective of
the payoﬀ distribution and irrespective of the behavior of the opponents. I will not study the
impact of altruism and spitefulness on oligopolistic competition.
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with such preferences is of the form
Ui(O(si, s
∗
−i)) = ui(O(si, s
∗
−i)) +
P
j 6=i
wij(si, s
∗
−i)uj(O(si, s
∗
−i)), (1)
where si is the strategy of player i, s∗−i is the strategy that the rest of the
players are playing, ui is the utility from outcomes of player i, uj is the utility
from outcomes of player j 6= i, and wij is a coeﬃcient that measures the weight
player i gives to player j’s utility, which is a function of the entire strategy profile.
Positive values of the coeﬃcient wij mean that player i is willing to sacrifice his
payoﬀ from outcomes in order to increase the payoﬀ of player j. Negative values
mean that player i is willing to sacrifice his payoﬀ from outcomes in order to
lower player j’s payoﬀ. Since the coeﬃcient wij depends on the strategy chosen
by player j, there is scope to model reciprocity.14
In this paper I apply Segal and Sobel’s (1999) approach since using psy-
chological games would complicate the analysis substantially without providing
additional insights into the problem.
3 Reciprocity and Cournot Competition
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of firms. Let price be determined according
to the inverse demand function P (Q), where Q =
P
qi. I make the standard
assumption that P (Q) is strictly positive on some bounded interval (0, Q¯) with
P (Q) = 0 for Q ≥ Q¯. I also assume that P (Q) is strictly decreasing in the
interval for which P (Q) > 0. Firms have costs of production given by Ci(qi).
Firms costs of production are assumed to be increasing. To incorporate prefer-
ences for reciprocity I assume that the payoﬀ function of the manager of firm i
is given by
Ui(qi,Q−i) = πi(qi, Q−i) + wi
¡
Q−i, Q
F
−i
¢ P
j 6=i
πj(qi, Q−i),
where πi(qi, Q−i) is profits of firm i and wi
¡
Q−i,Q
F
−i
¢
is the weight that man-
ager i places on its rivals aggregate profits
P
j 6=i πj(qi,Q−i). As usual, firm i’s
profits depend on firm i’s output, qi, and on the aggregate output of its rivals,
Q−i, such that
πi(qi, Q−i) = Ri (qi, Q−i)− Ci(qi),
where Ri(qi, Q−i) = P (Q) qi is revenue. I assume that the weight manager
i places on its rivals aggregate profits depends on his perception of the fair
aggregate output of his rivals, QF−i, and on the aggregate output of his rivals.
Furthermore, I assume that
wi(Q−i,Q
F
−i)
⎧
⎨
⎩
> 0 if Q−i < QF−i,
= 0 if Q−i = QF−i
< 0 otherwise
, (2)
14The underlying preferences in (1) are defined over outcomes. If an outcome specifies a
material payoﬀ to each player, then it is permissible for ui to depend on other players’ material
payoﬀs. Thus, this approach also generalizes the inequity aversion approach.
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that is, the manager of firm i places a positive weight on his rivals aggregate
profits when the rivals produce less than QF−i, he places no weight on his rivals
profits when the rivals produce QF−i, and he places a negative weight on his
rivals profits when the rivals produce more than QF−i. These conditions capture
the fact that a reciprocal manager cares about the intentions of his rivals.
The first condition expresses constructive reciprocity. If manager i expects
the aggregate output of his rivals to fall short of his own perception of the
fair aggregate output of the rivals, then manager i is willing to sacrifice some
of firm i’s profits to increase the rivals’ profits. The third condition expresses
destructive reciprocity. When manager i expects his rivals to produce more
than his perception of the fair aggregate output of the rivals, then manager i is
willing to sacrifice some of firm i’s profits to reduce the rivals’ profits.15
I assume throughout that managers’ preferences for reciprocity as well as
perceptions of the fair aggregate of the rivals are common knowledge. The
problem of manager i is to maximize its payoﬀ function taking the quantities
produced by its rivals as given, that is, manager i solves the following problem
max
qi
Ui(qi, Q−i) = πi(qi,Q−i) + wi
¡
Q−i,Q
F
−i
¢ P
j 6=i
πj(qi, Q−i).
The best reply to Q−i is given by
rRi (Q−i) = argqi maxP (Q) qi − Ci(qi) + wi(Q−i, Q
F
−i)
P
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj − Cj(qj)] .
(3)
Let qF = (QF−1, Q
F
−2, . . . , Q
F
−n) denote the vector of managers’ perceptions of
the fair aggregate output of their rivals. Let the n-firm Cournot oligopoly with
reciprocal managers be denoted by ΓR(U,w, qF ). To begin the analysis I need
to guarantee existence of equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, qF ).
There are four types of existence results which may apply to the Cournot
model. The first type of result uses the standard existence theorem due to Nash
and shows that every n-firm Cournot oligopoly has a Nash equilibrium if each
firm’s payoﬀ is quasiconcave in qi.16
The second type of result, due to Bamon and Frayssé (1985) and Novshek
(1985), shows that every n-firm Cournot oligopoly has a Nash equilibrium if each
firm’s payoﬀ depends on other firms’ outputs only via their sum and marginal
revenue is a decreasing function of the aggregate output of all other firms.
The third type of result deals with cases in which the Cournot game is
a supermodular game. Here there are two diﬀerent types of results, one for
n = 2 and another one for n ≥ 2. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that
if the natural order on of one of the firms’ action sets is reversed, then the
Cournot duopoly is a supermodular game.17 Amir (1996) provides conditions
15Weighting functions that satisfy condition (2) arise naturally. For example,
wi(Q−i, QF−i) = α(Q
F
−i − Q−i), wi(Q−i, QF−i) = α(QF−i − Q−i)3, or wi(Q−i, QF−i) =
α
³
QF−i/Q−i − 1
´
, with α > 0.
16This existence result is quite restrictive. See Ch. 4 in Vives (2001).
17This argument breaks down when there are three or more firms.
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under which the n-firm Cournot oligopoly is a log-supermodular game. However,
under these conditions, best replies are increasing which is not considered to be
the “normal” case in Cournot games. Finally, Tarsky (1955), McManus (1962,
1964), and Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977), show that every n-firm symmetric
Cournot oligopoly has a Nash equilibrium if cost functions are convex.
My goal is not only to prove existence of equilibria for the Cournot game with
reciprocal managers but also to state comparative static results. The assump-
tions required to state each of the four existence results imply diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
between generality in existence versus generality in comparative static results.
I decide to focus on the Cournot duopoly case and treat it as a supermodular
game. However, to provide intuition for some of the results I will often use the
n-firm smooth version of the Cournot oligopoly game with quasiconcave and
diﬀerentiable payoﬀ functions.
My first result guarantees that the Cournot duopoly game with reciprocal
managers is a supermodular game.
Lemma 1: If n = 2 and Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi, Q−i), then
ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game.
The assumption that the payoﬀ function has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q−i)
means that the marginal returns to a manager from increasing output are lower
if the rivals produce a higher output. Note that if managers care about prof-
its, then the requirement that πi has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi, Q−i) boils
down to the assumption that the revenue of firm i has decreasing diﬀerences
in (qi, Q−i). However, if managers have preferences for reciprocity, then the re-
quirement that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q−i) also implies that the
weight that manager i places on the payoﬀ from reciprocity can not be too large
by comparison to the weight he places on firm i’s profits.
The best way to illustrate this point is to refer to a smooth version of the
n-firm Cournot oligopoly game with reciprocal managers.18 In that game the
condition that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi, Q−i) is equivalent to requiring
that
∂2Ui
∂qi∂Q−i
= P 0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi + ∂
©
wi
¡
Q−i, Q
F
−i
¢
P 0 (Q)Q−i
ª
/∂Q−i < 0.
This condition is satisfied if the decreasing marginal revenue property holds, that
is, P 0(Q)+P 00 (Q) qi < 0, and if the impact of a change in rivals’ output on man-
ager i’s marginal payoﬀ from reciprocity is relatively small by comparison with
its impact on marginal revenue, that is ∂
©
wi
¡
Q−i, Q
F
−i
¢
P 0 (Q)Q−i
ª
/∂Q−i <
|P 0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi| .
18 In the smooth version of the n-firm Cournot oligoply game P (Q) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable with P 0(Q) < 0 (in the interval for which P (Q) > 0) and that the decreasing
marginal revenue property holds, that is, P 0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi ≤ 0. Firms costs of production
are assumed to twice continuously diﬀerentiable with C0i ≥ 0. The function wi(Q−i, QF−i) is
assumed to be diﬀerentiable in both arguments with ∂wi/∂Q−i < 0 and ∂wi/∂QF−i > 0.
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Thus, if preferences for reciprocity are very important relative to profits, then
quantities may be strategic complements over some output ranges and strategic
substitutes over others. If that happens, then I can no longer use the theory
of supermodular games to state general results that characterize the impact of
reciprocity on Cournot competition. Lemma 1 rules out this possibility.
If ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game, then it follows from Topkis (1979),
that the equilibrium set is non-empty and has a smallest and a largest pure-
strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium.19 The next result shows how managers’
perceptions of the fair output of their rivals change the outcome of Cournot
competition.
Proposition 1 If n = 2, ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game, and Ui has
decreasing diﬀerences in
¡
qi, Q
F
−i
¢
, then the smallest and the largest Cournot-
Nash equilibria of ΓR(U,w, qF ) are nonincreasing functions of qF .
This result tells us that if the weight that managers place on reciprocity
is relatively small by comparison to the weight they place on profits and the
marginal returns from increasing output are decreasing with managers’ percep-
tions of the fair output of their rivals, then the higher are managers’ perceptions
of the fair output of their rivals the lower is the set of Cournot-Nash equilibria.20
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The assumption that the
manager’s payoﬀ function has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi, QF−i) means that the
larger a reciprocal manager perceives the fair output of their rivals to be, the
smaller are the marginal returns from increasing production.21 Thus, an increase
in QF−i shifts the best reply of a reciprocal manager i towards the origin. In
other words, the more manager i perceives the fair output of his rivals to be
high, the more he is willing to produce a smaller output level for any output
level of the rivals. If this happens for every manager in every firm, then the
higher are managers’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals the lower will
be the set of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1 is a comparative statics result that characterizes the impact
that mangers’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals have on equilibrium
quantities of Cournot competition. I am also interested in comparing the out-
come of Cournot competition among firms with reciprocal managers to that of
Cournot competition among firms with managers who only care about maxi-
19Thes assumption that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q−i) guarantees that best
replies are decreasing and this implies existence of equilibrium.
20Note that this result does not imply that all Nash equilibria of Γ(U,w, qF ) are nonincreas-
ing functions of qF . In fact we may have that a Nash equilibrium in the interior of the set of
Nash equilibria of Γ(U,w, q¯F ) may be higher than the correspondent Nash equilibrium in the
interior of the set of Nash equilibria of Γ(U,w, qˆF ) with qˆF higher than q¯F . Still, a decrease
in equilibrium output can be justified by a coordination argument since the smallest Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is the most preferred equilibrium for firms whereas the largest equilibrium
is the less preferred one.
21 In the smooth version of the n-firm Cournot oligopoly game with reciprocal managers the
condition that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,QF−i) is equivalent to the requirement that
∂2Ui/∂qi∂QF−i < 0. In that game we have that ∂
2Ui/∂qi∂QF−i =
³
∂wi/∂QF−i
´
P 0(Q)Q−i.
Since P 0(Q) < 0 and Q−i > 0 the condition holds if ∂wi/∂QF−i > 0.
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mizing profits. To do that I compare the equilibria of game ΓS(π), the standard
supermodular Cournot game with managers who only care about profits, to
the equilibria of ΓR(U,w, qF ), the supermodular Cournot game with reciprocal
managers. I assume that these two games are identical in all respects (market de-
mand, costs, and number of firms) with the exception of managers’ preferences.
However, allowing for multiple equilibria makes the comparison cumbersome.
Thus, I assume that the game ΓS(π) has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q−i), and
that best replies have a slope greater than −1.22 It is a well known result that
these two conditions guarantee that ΓS(π) has a unique equilibrium. Lemma
2 provides conditions under which the game ΓR(U,w, qF ) also has a unique
equilibrium.
Lemma 2: If n = 2, ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game, and the managers’
best replies have a slope greater than −1, then there exists an unique equilibrium
of ΓR(U,w, qF ).
This result guarantees that the supermodular Cournot game with reciprocal
managers has a unique equilibrium. The condition that drives the result is the
assumption that best replies have a slope strictly between (−1, 0).23 I am now
ready to state the first result that compares the outcome of Cournot competition
with reciprocal managers to that of Cournot competition with managers who
only care about profits.
Proposition 2: If n = 2, ΓS(π) is a supermodular game such that best replies
have a slope greater than −1, ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game such that
(i) Ui = πi + wi
P
j 6=i πj ,
(ii) Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in ( qi, QF−i),
22 In the smooth version of the standard n-firm Cournot oligopoly game these assumptions
are satisfied if the decreasing marginal revenue property holds, marginal cost is increasing,
and P 0(Q) − C00i (qi) < 0, i = 1, . . . , n. Under these conditions the profit of firm i is strictly
concave in qi.This follows since ∂2πi/∂q2i = P
0(Q) +P 00(Q)qi +P 0(Q)−C00i (qi) < 0. We also
have that ∂2πi/∂qi∂Q−i = P 0(Q) + P 00(Q)qi < 0. It also follows that the best reply function
of firm i is has its slope is in the interval (−1, 0):
r0i(Q−i) = −
∂2πi/∂qi∂Q−i
∂2πi/∂q2i
= − P
0(Q) + P 00(Q)qi
P 0(Q) + P 00(Q)qi + P 0(Q)−C00i (qi)
.
Theorem 2.8 in Vives (2001) shows that these conditions imply that the smooth version of
the standard n-firm Cournot oligopoly game has a unique equilibrium.
23 In the smooth version of the n-firm Cournot oligopoly game with reciprocal managers the
slope of the best reply of firm i is given by r0i(Q−i) = −
∂2Ui/∂qi∂Q−i
∂2Ui/∂q2i
, where
r0i(Q−i) =
P 0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi + ∂
n
wi(Q−i,QF−i)P
0 (Q)Q−i
o
/∂Q−i
P 0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi + P 0(Q)−C00(qi) + wi(Q−i, QF−i)P 00 (Q)Q−i,
.
The slope is strictly above −1 if¯¯¯
∂
n
wi(Q−i, Q
F
−i)P
0 (Q)Q−i
o
/∂Q−i
¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯
P 0(Q)−C00(qi) +wi(Q−i,QF−i)P 00 (Q)Q−i
¯¯¯
.
This condition implies that the game has a unique equilibrium by Theorem 2.8 in Vives
(2001).
10
(iii) the managers’ best replies have a slope greater than −1, and
(iv) QF−i = Q
NS
−i for all i,
then the Nash equilibrium of ΓS(π) coincides with that of ΓR(U,w, qF ).
Proposition 2 shows that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à la
Cournot and managers perceive the fair output of their rivals to be equal to the
output that the rivals would produce if they only cared about profits, then they
will produce the same quantities as the ones produced by managers who only
care about profits. In this case preferences for reciprocity just pivot managers’
best replies around the Cournot-Nash outcome of the game played between
managers who only care about profits and so the equilibrium is left unchanged.
In this case market output, consumer welfare, and profits are the same with
reciprocal managers or with managers who only care about profits.
To clarify the intuition Proposition 2 I refer to the smooth n-firm Cournot
oligopoly game with reciprocal managers. In that game the best reply of man-
ager i to Q−i is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
∂Ui
∂qi
= P (Q) + P 0 (Q) qi − C 0i(qi) + wi(Q−i, QF−i)P 0 (Q)Q−i = 0. (4)
It is straightforward to interpret this condition. The term P (Q) + P 0 (Q) qi
represents marginal revenue and the term C0i(qi)marginal cost. These two terms
represent the impact that a change in qi has on firm i’s profit.24 The novelty
here is the term wi(Q−i,QF−i)P
0 (Q)Q−i. This term represents the impact that
a change in qi has on manager i’s payoﬀ from reciprocity.
It follows from (4) that the best reply of a reciprocal manager i intercepts
the best reply of a manager who only cares about profits at Q−i = QF−i. This
happens because Q−i = QF−i implies wi(Q−i, Q
F
−i) = 0 and (4) reduces to
MRi = MCi which implies that market output is the same with reciprocal
managers or with managers who only care about maximizing profits.
Proposition 2 tells us that a critical condition for the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium of the game with reciprocal managers to diﬀer from the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of the game with managers who only care about profits is that recip-
rocal managers’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals are diﬀerent from
the equilibrium output of the rivals when managers only care about profits. The
next result explores the implications of this possibility.
Proposition 3: If n = 2, ΓS(π) is a supermodular game such that best replies
have a slope greater than −1, ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game such that
(i) Ui = πi + wi
P
j 6=i πj ,
(ii) Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in ( qi, QF−i),
(iii) the managers’ best replies have a slope greater than −1, and
(iv) QF−i > (<)Q
NS
−i for all i,
then the Nash equilibrium of ΓS(π) is greater (smaller) than that of ΓR(U,w, qF ).
24 In the standard smooth n-firm Cournot oligopoly game the best reply of firm i to Q−i is
the unique solution to the first-order condition ∂πi/∂qi = P (Q) + P 0 (Q) qi −C0i(qi) = 0.
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Proposition 3 tells us that if reciprocal managers perceive the fair output
of their rivals to be greater than the equilibrium output that the rivals would
produce if all managers only cared about profits, then reciprocal managers will
produce less than managers who only care about profits. This is the constructive
reciprocity equilibrium. On the other hand, if reciprocal managers perceive the
fair output of their rivals to be smaller than the equilibrium output that the
rivals would produce if all managers only cared about profits, then reciprocal
managers will produce more than managers who only care about profits. This
is the destructive reciprocity equilibrium.
In a constructive reciprocity equilibrium market output is smaller than the
one of Cournot competition with managers who only care about profits. Thus,
consumers are worse oﬀ if reciprocal managers’ perceptions of fairness lead to
a constructive reciprocity equilibrium than if managers only care about maxi-
mizing profits. The opposite happens in a destructive reciprocity equilibrium:
market output is larger than that in the equilibrium of the Cournot game with
managers who only care about profits and consumers are better oﬀ.
The intuition behind the constructive reciprocity equilibrium can be illus-
trated by (4). If a reciprocal manager i expects his rivals to produce an equi-
librium output smaller than QF−i, then his best reply is to produce a smaller
amount than the one he would produce if he only cared about profits. This
happens because if Q−i < QF−i, then manager i places a positive weight on his
rivals profits and this implies that wi(Q−i, QF−i)P
0 (Q)Q−i < 0. In this case, if
manager i produces less than the best reply of a manager who only cares about
profits, then he has a first-order gain in payoﬀ from constructive reciprocity
(he increases the profits of his opponents) and a second-order loss in profits (he
reduces the profits of his firm). Manager i will reduce production until the dif-
ference between marginal revenue and marginal cost equals the marginal payoﬀ
from constructive reciprocity.
The intuition behind the destructive reciprocity equilibrium can also be
illustrated by (4). If a reciprocal manager i expects his rivals to produce
an equilibrium output greater than QF−i, then his best reply is to produce a
larger amount than the one he would produce if he only cared about prof-
its. This happens because if Q−i > QF−i, then manager i places a negative
weight on his rivals profits, that is, wi(Q−i, QF−i) < 0. This in turn implies that
wi(Q−i,Q
F
−i)P
0 (Q)Q−i > 0. If this is the case, then (4) is not satisfied if man-
ager i would produce the best reply of a manager who only cares about profits
since then we would have MRi −MCi = 0 but wi(Q−i,QF−i)P 0 (Q)Q−i > 0.
In fact, if manager i produces slightly more than the best reply of a manager
who only cares about profits he has a first-order gain in payoﬀ from destruc-
tive reciprocity (he reduces the profits of his rivals) and a second-order loss in
material payoﬀ (he reduces the profits of his firm). Manager i will increase pro-
duction until the diﬀerence between marginal revenue and marginal cost equals
the marginal payoﬀ from destructive reciprocity.
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4 Inequity Aversion and Cournot Competition
Another important type of interdependent preferences is inequity aversion. To
study the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot competition I assume that
manager i’s payoﬀ function is additively separable in firm i’s profits and the
profits of his rivals, that is
Ui(πi,π−i) = πi +
P
j 6=i
λij(πj − πi),
where λij is a function that measures how diﬀerences in profits between firm
j and firm i have an impact on the weight that manager i puts on firm j’s
profits.25 Furthermore, I assume that
λij(πj − πi)
⎧
⎨
⎩
> 0 if πj < πi
= 0 if πj = πi
< 0 otherwise
, (5)
that is, manager i places a positive weight on firm j’s profits when j’s profits are
smaller than those of firm i, he places no weight on j’s profits when j’s profits
are equals to those of firm i, and he places a negative weight on j’s profits when
j’s profits are greater than those of firm i. These conditions capture the fact
that an inequity averse manager cares about the distribution of profits. The
first condition expresses aversion to advantageous inequity. If firm i’s profits
are greater than those of firm j then manager i is willing to sacrifice some of
firm i’s profits to increase firm j’s profits. The last third condition expresses
aversion to disadvantageous inequity. If firm i’s profits are smaller than those
of firm j then manager i is willing to sacrifice some of firm i’s profits to reduce
firm j’s profits.
The problem of manager i is to maximize his payoﬀ function taking the
quantities produced by the other firms as given and taking into consideration
the impact of its output choice on the distribution of profits, that is
max
qi
Ui(qi,Q−i) = πi(qi,Q−i) +
P
j 6=i
λij(πj(qi, Q−i)− πi(qi, Q−i)).
The best reply of an inequity averse manager i to Q−i is given by
ri(Q−i) = argqi maxπi(qi, Q−i) +
P
j 6=i
λij(πj(qi, Q−i)− πi(qi, Q−i)).
I assume that the game is smooth and symmetric.26 Furthermore, I start the
25Neilson (2006) oﬀers a full axiomatic characterization of this payoﬀ function.
26 It is hard to state general results that characterize the impact of inequity aversion on
Cournot competition for asymmetric games. In those games firms have diﬀerent costs of pro-
duction or diﬀerent weight functions. If firms have diﬀerent costs, then the most eﬃcient firms
will produce more output and have higher profits and the less eﬃcient firms will produce less
output and have lower profits. This implies that the most eﬃcient firms will fell compassion
toward the less eﬃcient firms and the less eﬃcient firms will feel envy toward the most eﬃ-
cient firms. This may lead the most eﬃcient firms to produce less than in a game with selfish
firms and the less eﬃcient firms to produce more. Thus, it is not clear how aggregate output
will change in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly game when firms are averse to inequality in
payoﬀs.
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analysis by assuming that λij is twice diﬀerentiable. If that is the case, then I
can write the first-order condition to manager i’s optimization problem as
∂Ui
∂qi
=
∂πi
∂qi
+
P
j 6=i
λ0ij(πj − πi)
µ
∂πj
∂qi
− ∂πi
∂qi
¶
= 0, (6)
where ∂πi/∂qi = P (Q) + P 0 (Q) qi − C0i(qi) and ∂πj/∂qi = P 0 (Q) qj , for all
j 6= i. To guarantee that the first-order condition is the solution to firm i’s the
problem I also assume that the payoﬀ function is strictly concave in qi.
Lemma 3: If¯¯¯¯
¯Pj 6=iλ00ij(πj − πi)
µ
∂πj
∂qi
− ∂πi
∂qi
¶2
+
P
j 6=i
λ0ij(πj − πi)
µ
∂2πj
∂q2i
− ∂
2πi
∂q2i
¶¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤
¯¯¯¯
∂2πi
∂q2i
¯¯¯¯
,
(7)
then there exists an equilibrium of the symmetric n-firm symmetric Cournot
game with inequity averse managers and the equilibrium is unique.
Condition (7) guarantees that the payoﬀ function of firm i is strictly concave
in qi. This guarantees existence of equilibrium. The assumption that the game
is symmetric together with condition (7) imply that the equilibrium is unique.
Let qNI = (qNI1 , . . . , q
NI
n ) denote the Nash equilibrium strategy profile of the
n-firm Cournot game with inequity averse firms. I can now state the following
result.
Proposition 4: In the n-firm smooth and symmetric Cournot game with in-
equity averse managers if
(i) λij(πj − πi) satisfies (5) and λ0ij(0) = 0 for all i and j, then qNI = qNS ;
(ii) λij(πj − πi) satisfies (5) and
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 for all i, then q
NI > qNS .
Proposition 4 provides conditions under which diﬀerentiable specifications
of inequity aversion will or will not change the equilibrium outcome of smooth
and symmetric Cournot games. Part (i) shows that the equilibrium strategy
profile of the symmetric Cournot game with inequity averse managers coincides
with that of the Cournot game with managers who only care about profits
if the weighting function satisfies condition (5) and λ0ij(0) = 0 for all i and
j.27 The intuition behind this result is as follows. The fact that the game is
symmetric together with the assumption that λ0ij(0) = 0, for all i and j, imply
inequity aversion pivots the best reply of each manager around the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium output of the game with managers who only care about profits.
This type of inequity aversion changes the best reply functions of firms but
does not change the equilibrium outcome of Cournot competition. Thus, when
27For example, the weighting function
λij(πj − πi) =
½
−αij(πj − πi)2, if πj ≥ πi
αij(πj − πi)2, otherwise
,
with αij > 0, satisfies condition (5) λ0ij(0) = 0 for all i and j.
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λ0ij(0) = 0 the market output with inequity averse managers is equal to the
market output with manages who only care about profits.
Part (ii) shows that the equilibrium strategy profile of the symmetric Cournot
game with inequity averse managers is greater than that of the game with man-
agers who only care about profits if the weighting function satisfies condition (5)
and
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 for all i.
28 The fact that the game is symmetric together
with the assumption that
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 for all i imply inequity aversion
pivots the best reply of manager i around the point qp ∈ rSi (Q−i) such thatP
j 6=i λ
0
ij(πj − πi)
¡
qpj − q
p
i
¢
< 0.29 This type of inequity aversion changes both
the best reply functions of firms as well as the equilibrium outcome of Cournot
competition. We see that if
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 for all i, then the market output
with inequity averse managers is strictly greater than the market output with
managers who only care about profits.30
Bolton and Ockenfels’s (2000) were the first to study the impact of inequity
aversion on equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. According to Bolton
and Ockenfels’s specification of inequity aversion the payoﬀ function takes the
form
Ui(π) = v
Ã
πi,
πiPn
j=1 πj
!
,
where the function v is assumed to be globally non-decreasing and concave in the
first argument, to be strictly concave in the second argument (relative payoﬀ),
and to satisfy v2(πi, 1/n) = 0 for all πi. Bolton and Ockenfels shows that this
type of inequity aversion has no impact on equilibrium outcomes in symmetric
Cournot games. Proposition 4 shows that Bolton and Ockenfels’s result is driven
by the assumption that v2(πi, 1/n) = 0 for all πi.
I now consider the impact that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) specification of
inequity aversion has on equilibrium outcomes of Cournot competition.31 Recall
that under the assumptions made in this paper the n-firm smooth Cournot game
has best reply functions with a negative slope, that is, quantities are strategic
substitutes. I will now show that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) form of inequity
aversion makes quantities become strategic complements over intermediate out-
put levels. I will also show that if managers with this type of preferences play
Cournot games, then there can be a continuum of symmetric equilibria.
According to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) specification manager i’s payoﬀ
28The weighting function λij(πj − πi) = −αij
£
(πj − πi)3 + (πj − πi)
¤
, with αij > 0,
satisfies condition (5) and λ0ij(0) = −αij < 0.
29We have that −
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(πj −πi)
£
P (Q)−C0i(qi)
¤
= P 0(Q)
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(πj −πi) (qj − qi) ,
with λ0ij(πj − πi) < 0 for all πj and πi. Since P (Q)−C0i(qi) > 0 and P 0(Q) < 0 the equality
is satisfied if
P
j 6=i
λ0ij(πj − πi) (qj − qi) < 0.
30Assumption (5) and diﬀerentiability rule out the case where λ0ij(0) > 0.
31Feher and Schmidt’s specification is applied frequently to study the impact of inequity
aversion on economic behavior.
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function is given by
Ui(πi,π−i) = πi −
"
αi
n− 1
P
j 6=i
max (πj − πi, 0) +
βi
n− 1 max
P
j 6=i
(πi − πj , 0)
#
.
(8)
The terms in the square bracket are the payoﬀ eﬀects of compassion and
envy, respectively. We see that if firm i’s profits are greater than the average
profits of its rivals then manager i feels compassion towards its rivals. However,
if firm i’s profits are smaller than the average profits of its rivals then manager i
feels envious of his rivals.32 This model of inequity aversion has piecewise linear
indiﬀerence curves over a firm’s own profits and its rivals’ profits.
Manager i’s inequity aversion towards its rivals is characterized by the pair
of parameters (αi,βi) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
33 Manager i exhibits strict inequity
aversion when both αi and βi are strictly greater than zero. Manager i only
cares about maximizing profits when αi = βi = 0. In all other cases manager
is (weakly) averse to inequity. I assume that αi and βi, i = 1, . . . , n, are
common knowledge. Let α = (α1, . . . ,αn) and β = (β1, . . . ,βn) . My next
result characterizes the best reply of a manager with piecewise linear inequity
aversion.
Proposition 5: The best reply of manager i in the n-firm Cournot game with
piecewise linear inequity aversion is defined by
ri(Q−i) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
si(Q−i), 0 ≤ 1n−1Q−i ≤ q(βi)
1
n−1Q−i, q (βi) ≤
1
n−1Q−i ≤ q(αi)
ti(Q−i), q(αi) ≤ 1n−1Q−i
,
where
si(Q−i) = argmax
qi
(1− βi)πi(qi, Q−i) +
βi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
πj(qi, Q−i),
ti(Q−i) = argmax
qi
(1 + αi)πi(qi, Q−i)−
αi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
πj(qi, Q−i),
q(βi) is the solution to (1− βi) [P (nq)− C0i(q)] +P 0(nq)q = 0, and q(αi) is the
solution to (1 + αi) [P (nq)− C0i(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0.
32When there are only two firms in the market manager i’s payoﬀ function becomes
Ui(πi,πj) = πi − [αimax (πj − πi, 0) + βimax (πi − πj , 0)] , i 6= j = 1, 2.
Fehr and Schmidt assume that the dislike of disadvantageous inequity is stronger than that of
advantageous inequity, i.e. αi > βi and that βi is smaller than 1. We make no assumptions
about the relation between αi and βi but we assume, like Fehr and Schmidt, that βi is smaller
than 1.
33Alternatively, I could have assumed that manager i has diﬀerent feelings of compassion
and envy towards each rival. In this case we would have two inequity aversion parameters for
each rival of each firm, that is, we would have αij and βij for i 6= j = 1, . . . , n . I assume,
like Ferh and Schmidt, that manager i feels the same degree of compassion and envy towards
all rivals.
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Proposition 5 characterizes the impact of piecewise linear inequity aversion
on a manager’s optimal output choice for any output levels of its rivals. It tells
us that a manager’s best reply is continuous like in the standard Cournot game
However, the best reply of a manager with piecewise linear inequity aversion is
no longer monotonic.
With piecewise linear inequity aversion the best reply of the manager has
three diﬀerent segments. When a firm’s rivals produce low output levels the
best response of an inequity averse manager has a negative slope and consists of
a smaller output level than the output level of a manager who only cares about
the profits of his firm. However, when a firm’s rivals produce intermediate
output levels the best response of an inequity averse manager has a positive
slope and consists in producing the average output level of the rivals. Finally,
when a firm’s rivals produce high output levels the best response of an inequity
averse manager has a negative slope and consists of a larger output level than
the output level a manager who only cares about his firm’s profits.
I am now ready to characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the n-firm
symmetric Cournot oligopoly game when managers are averse to inequity in the
sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). I do that in the next two results.
Proposition 6: The unique Nash equilibrium of the n-firm symmetric Cournot
game with managers who only care about the profits of their own firms is always
an equilibrium of the n-firm symmetric Cournot game with piecewise linear in-
equity averse managers.
Recall that, under the assumptions made, there is a unique equilibrium of
the symmetric Cournot game with managers who only care about the profits
of their own firms. In that equilibrium firms produce the same amount and
the market price is between the perfectly competitive market price and the
monopoly price. Proposition 6 shows that this equilibrium always belongs to
the set of equilibria of the Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity aversion
managers.
Proposition 7: The set of Nash equilibria of the n-firm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse managers is given by
NIA = {(q1, . . . , qn) : qi = qj , ∀i 6= j, and q(β) ≤ qi ≤ q(α), i = 1, . . . , n} ,
where q(β) = max [q (β1) , . . . , q(βn)] , and q(α) = min [q(α1), . . . , q(αn)] .
Proposition 7 tells us that if all managers are strictly averse to inequity,
then there is a continuum of equilibria in the n-firm symmetric Cournot game
with inequity averse managers.34 It follows that in some of the equilibria of
the Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity aversion, the market price
may be lower than the equilibrium market price in the Cournot game with
managers who only care about the profits of their own firms whereas in other
34The continuum of equilibria also exists when the game is not too asymmetric. However,
when there are large cost asymmetries between firms there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium.
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equilibria the market price may be higher. Thus, it is not clear whether piecewise
linear inequity aversion is generally good or bad for consumers (or for firms).35
However, we can state conditions under which piecewise linear inequity aversion
is good or bad for consumers and firms. To do that I look at the impact of
changes in the managers’ degree of compassion and envy.
Proposition 8: The largest Nash equilibria of the n-firm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse managers is a nondecreasing function
of α. The smallest Nash equilibria is a nonincreasing function of β.
This welfare result characterizes the impact of compassion and envy on the
set of Nash equilibria of the Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity averse
managers. It tells us that there is a weak complementarity between the man-
agers’ degree of compassion and equilibrium output, that is, an increase in
envy increases the market output produced in the largest Nash equilibria of
the Cournot model with inequity averse managers. If that is the case, then
an increase in the degree of envy reduces firms’ profits and increases consumer
surplus.
On the other hand, Proposition 8 tells us that an increase in compassion re-
duces the market output produced in the smallest Nash equilibria of the Cournot
model with piecewise linear inequity averse managers. If that is the case, then
an increase in the degree of compassion increases firms’ profits and decreases
consumer surplus.36
The next result studies the implications of an increase in the number of firms
when there is quantity competition in markets where managers have piecewise
linear inequity aversion. To state this result I assume that αi and βi, i =
1, . . . , n, are drawn from a uniform distribution with support on [0, 1] .
Proposition 9: As the number of firms increases the set of Nash equilibria of
the n-firm symmetric Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity averse man-
agers converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of n-firm symmetric Cournot
game with manages who only care about the profits of their own firms.
This result shows that increasing the number of firms reduces the impact
of piecewise linear inequity aversion on the set of Nash equilibria of the n-firm
Cournot game. This happens because when there are n firms, the smallest Nash
equilibria of the game is determined by the firm that has the manager with the
35Proposition 7 also shows that if there is at least one manager who is not averse to inequity,
then there is a unique equilibrium of the symmetric Cournot game with piecewise linear
inequity aversion: the equilibrium of the symmetric Cournot game with managers who only
care about profits of their own firms. This point has been made before in papers that study the
implications of interdependent preferences in ultimatum games and in perfectly competitive
markets. See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Segal and Sobel
(2004).
36This result is quite intuitive. In fact, Fehr and Schmidt’s payoﬀ function implies that if
manager i has a higher monetary payoﬀ than the average payoﬀ of his opponents and βi = 1/2,
then manager i is just as willing to keep one dollar to himself as to give it to his rivals. Now,
suppose that all managers have the same preferences as manager i. In this case managers are
acting as if they are maximizing their joint profit,
P
πi. So, if βi = 1/2, with i = 1, . . . , n,
then compassion leads to the best collusive outcome.
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lowest degree of compassion. Similarly, the largest Nash equilibria of the game
is determined by the firm that has the manager with the lowest degree of envy.37
If the levels of compassion and envy of each manager in each firm are drawn from
a uniform distribution with support on [0, 1] , then an increase in the number
of firms makes it more likely that the lowest level of compassion as well as the
lowest level of envy are both very close to zero. Thus, as the number of firms
increases the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of the n-firm symmetric
Cournot game with inequity averse managers converges to that of the Cournot
game with managers who only care about the profits of their own firms.38
5 Bertrand Competition
In the standard model of Bertrand competition firms select independently the
price for the product and every firm has the commitment to supply whatever
demand is forthcoming at the price it sets. Demand is strictly downward-sloping
when positive, cutting both axes, and firms have increasing cost functions Ci(qi).
Firms that set the lowest price split the demand and the remaining firms do not
sell anything. That is, given a vector of prices (pi)i∈N the sales of firm i are
qi =
½
D(pi)
l , if pj ≥ pi,∀j ∈ N
0, otherwise
,
where l = # {j ∈ N : pj = pi} . It is a well know result that equilibrium out-
comes of Bertrand competition depend on the shape of the cost function. If
marginal costs are constant and identical, then the only equilibrium is one where
all firms set price equal to marginal cost, have zero profits, and split the market
demand equally.39
Here I will focus on the impact of reciprocity and inequity aversion on
Bertrand competition with constant and identical marginal costs. I start by
extending the model by allowing managers to have preferences for reciprocity.
I assume that the payoﬀ of manager i becomes
Ui(pi, p−i) = πi(pi, p−i) +
P
j 6=i
wij
¡
pj , p
F
¢
πj(pi, p−i),
where
wij(pj , p
f )
⎧
⎨
⎩
> 0 if pj > pf
= 0 if pj = pf
< 0 otherwise
, (9)
37The same intuition is present in the first model in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
38Huck et al. (2004) review of the evidence on experimental Cournot markets. They find
that evidence from experimental Cournot games shows that when there are only two firms in
the market collusive outcomes are frequent. However, as the number of firms increases output
approaches the Nash-equilibrium.
39Dastidar (1995) shows that in symmetric Bertrand competition with increasing marginal
costs (decreasing returns), there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria where firms set a price
in the interval [pL, pH ] , and this interval contains the perfectly competitive price.
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that is, manager i places a positive weight on the profits of a rival that sets
a price above the fair price, pf , he places no weight on the profits of a rival
that sets price equal to pf , and he places a negative weight on the profits of a
rival that sets price below pf . I assume that the fair price is equal to or above
marginal cost, c, and equal to or lower than the monopoly price, pm, that is
pf ∈ [c, pm] , with pm = maxp(p− c)D(p). In the symmetric equilibrium of the
n-firm symmetric Bertrand game with constant marginal costs and preferences
for reciprocity firms will charge a price p ∈
£
pf , pm
¤
that is higher than marginal
cost if and only if
1
n
pD(p) +
n− 1
n
w(p, pf )pD(p) ≥ pD(p)
or w(p, pf ) ≥ 1. This condition says that managers have to place more weight on
a rival’s profit than on their own profit for price to be above marginal cost. Such
a high weight to preferences for reciprocity is not plausible. Thus, this result
tells us that preferences for reciprocity should have no impact on Bertrand
competition.
The last result in the paper characterizes the equilibrium of the n-firm sym-
metric Bertrand game when managers have piecewise linear inequity aversion
and constant marginal costs.40
Proposition 10: The set of Nash equilibria of the n-firm symmetric Bertrand
game with piecewise linear inequity averse managers and constant marginal costs
is given by
pi =
½
a, if 1− 1n ≤ min (β1, . . . ,βn)
c, otherwise
,
where a ∈ (c, p¯] , with p¯ being the choke-oﬀ price for demand.
This result shows that if marginal cost are constant and there is at least
one manager with a degree of compassion smaller than 1 − 1/n, then the only
equilibrium is for all firms to charge price equal to marginal cost. By contrast,
if marginal costs are constant and all managers have a degree of compassion
greater than 1− 1/n, then there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria where
firms charge a price between marginal cost and the price that leads to zero
market demand.
There are two interpretations of Proposition 10. For a fixed number of
firms, this result tells us that piecewise linear inequity aversion can only raise
price above marginal cost in Bertrand competition between firms with constant
marginal costs when all managers have a very high level of compassion.41 For
a fixed level of compassion, say β, with β ∈ (1/2, 1), this result tells us that an
increase in the number of firms makes it is harder for piecewise linear inequity
aversion to lead firms to set price above marginal cost. Of course, if we assume
40The result extends to other forms of inequity aversion.
41Recall that if β = 1/2 implies that a manager is just indiﬀerent between keeping one
dollar to heself and giving this dollar to her competitors.
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that βi, i = 1, . . . , n, has a uniform distribution on [0, 1], then an increase in n
raises 1− 1n and reduces min (β1, . . . ,βn) which makes it even harder to satisfy
the condition that allows firms to charge price above marginal cost.
6 Endogenous Timing and Dynamic Oligopoly
This section discusses two other market games where introducing interdependent
preferences may provide new insights on economic behavior.
The literature on endogenous timing market games tries to identify factors
that might lead to the endogenous emergence of sequential or simultaneous play
in oligopolistic markets. The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stack-
elberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in this literature. Several
experiments have tried to validate this prediction, but failed to find support for
it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move symmetric out-
comes are modal. Santos-Pinto (2006) shows that inequity aversion is able to
organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games since
it makes symmetric outcomes more attractive to players than asymmetric ones.
Santos-Pinto (2007) studies the impact of preferences for reciprocity in the
infinitely repeated versions of the Cournot and Bertrand games. He finds that,
for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collu-
sion in both types of games. Introducing preferences for reciprocity in the in-
finitely repeated Cournot game implies that the punishment outcome becomes
a destructive reciprocity state whereas the collusive outcome becomes a con-
structive reciprocity state. These two eﬀects imply that the critical discount
rate at wish collusion can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game
tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms
only care about profits. In the infinitely repeated Bertrand game preferences
for reciprocity do not alter the payoﬀ of the punishment outcome nor that of
the one period deviation. However, they raise the payoﬀ of collusion when firms
perceptions of the fair market price are strictly below the monopoly price.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of interdependent preferences (reciprocity and
inequity aversion) on Cournot and Bertrand competition. The results obtained
shows that interdependent preferences may lead to more or less competitive out-
comes in the static Cournot model of strategic interaction between firms. This
depends critically on firms’ perceptions of fairness. The paper also shows that
interdependent preferences should have no impact on Bertrand competition.
There are many interesting avenues for research on this topic that are beyond
the scope of this paper. For example, what happens to equilibrium outcomes
when some managers have interdependent preferences and others do not. If firms
can select managers with diﬀerent preferences which ones should be chosen? Do
market forces eliminate managers with interdependent preferences?
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: It is a well known result that a Cournot duopoly game
with decreasing best replies, when one firm’s strategy set is given the reverse
order, is a supermodular game—see pp. 34 in Vives (2001). If Ui has decreas-
ing diﬀerences in (qi, qj), then managers’ best replies are decreasing and so
ΓR(U,w, qF ) is a supermodular game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Theorem 2.8 in Vives (2001). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We know by Lemma 2 that ΓR(U,w, qF ) has a unique
equilibrium. Let qNR = (qNR1 , . . . , q
NR
n ) denote the unique Nash equilibrium of
ΓR(U,w, qF ). Let qNS = (qNS1 , . . . , q
NS
n ) denote the unique Nash equilibrium
of ΓS(π). I wish to show that if QF−i = Q
NS
−i , then q
NR
i = q
NS
i , with i = 1, 2.
To do that I only need show that a reciprocal manager i has no incentive to
deviate from qNRi = q
NS
i when his rival plays Q
NR
−i = Q
NS
−i = Q
F
−i. But, if
QF−i = Q
NS
−i = Q
NR
−i then wi(Q−i, Q
F
−i) = 0. If that is the case, then the best
reply of manager i to QNR−i is indeed q
NR
i = q
NS
i . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We know from Proposition 1 that if qˆF = qNS, then
qNR = qNS . If q˜F > (<)qˆF = qNS , then Proposition 1 implies that the unique
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, q˜F ) is smaller (greater) than the unique
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, qˆF ) Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: To prove existence of equilibrium we only need to show
that condition (7) implies that the payoﬀ function of manager i is strictly con-
cave in qi. The second derivative of the payoﬀ function of manager i is given
by
∂2Ui
∂q2i
=
∂2πi
∂q2i
+
P
j 6=i
λ00ij(πj − πi)
µ
∂πj
∂qi
− ∂πi
∂qi
¶2
+
P
j 6=i
λ0ij(πj − πi)
µ
∂2πj
∂q2i
− ∂
2πi
∂q2i
¶
,
where ∂2πi/∂q2i = 2P
0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi − C 00(qi) and ∂2πj/∂q2i = P 00 (Q) qj , for
all j 6= i. Manager i’s payoﬀ function is strictly concave in qi if ∂2Ui/∂q2i < 0.
It is easy to check that condition (7) implies ∂2Ui/∂q2i < 0. The assumption
that the game is symmetric implies that there is a unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The symmetry assumption implies that qi = qj , for
all i 6= j, and this implies that πi = πj , for all i 6= j. If that is the case, then
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(6) is given by
∂πi
∂qi
+
P
j 6=i
λ0ij(0)
Ã
∂πj
∂qi
− ∂πi
∂qi
¯¯¯¯
qi=qj
!
= 0,
with
∂πj
∂qi
− ∂πi
∂qi
¯¯¯¯
qi=qj
= P 0(Q)qj − [P 0(Q)qi + P (Q)− C 0(qi)]|qi=qj
= − [P (Q)− C 0(qi)] . (10)
Using (10) the first-order condition becomes
∂Ui
∂qi
= P 0(Q)qi + [P (Q)− C 0(qi)]
"
1−
P
j 6=i
λ0ij(0)
#
= 0. (11)
If λ0ij(0) = 0 for all i and j, then (11) reduces to ∂πi/∂qi = 0 and this im-
plies qNI = qNS . This proves part (i). If
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 for all i, then
1−
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) > 1 in (11). Suppose, by contradiction that q
NI = qNS . If that
is the case, then 1 −
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) > 1 in (11) together with P (Q) − C0(qi) > 0
and P 0(Q) < 0 imply that the left-hand side of (11) is positive. Thus, qNI =
qNS is not an equilibrium when
P
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 for all i. The assumption
that marginal revenue is decreasing, that C 00i (qi) − P 0(Q) > 0 together withP
j 6=i λ
0
ij(0) < 0 imply that ∂
2Ui/∂q2i < 0. This in turn implies that q
NI > qNS .
This proves part (ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: To prove this result I will start by showing that
q(αi) is an increasing function of αi and that q(βi) is a decreasing function of
βi for i = 1, . . . , n. Let
h(q,αi) = (1 + αi) [P (nq)− C0i(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0,
g(q,βi) = (1− βi) [P (nq)− C 0i(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0,
which imply
∂q
∂αi
= −∂h/∂αi
∂h/∂q
= − P (Q)− C
0
i(q)
(1 + n(1 + αi))P 0(Q) + nP 00(Q)q − C00i (q)
> 0,
∂q
∂βi
= −∂g/∂βi
∂g/∂q
= − − [P (Q)− C
0
i(q)]
(1 + n(1− βi))P 0(Q) + nP 00(Q)q − C00i (q)
< 0,
since P 0(Q) < 0, P 0(Q) ≤ 0, and C 00i (qi) ≥ 0.
I will now show that qi = 1n−1
P
j 6=i qj is a best response for manager i when
the rivals produce
qNi ≤ q¯j ≤ q(αi), (12)
24
where q¯j = 1n−1
P
j 6=i qj . To do that I will show that manager i can not gain
from deviating from qi = q¯j when (12) holds. Suppose, that (12) holds and that
firm i produces qi = q¯j + ε, with ε > 0. In this case manager i’s payoﬀ is
Ui = (1− βi) [P (Q) qi − Ci(qi)] +
βi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj − Cj(qj)]
and the change in manager i’s payoﬀ from producing qi = q¯j + ε, ε > 0, instead
of q¯j is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1− βi) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)− C 0i(qi)] +
βi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
qi=q¯j
(ε)
= [(P 0 (nq¯j) q¯j + P (nq¯j)− C0i(q¯j))− βi (P (nq¯j)− C 0i(q¯j))] ε.
The square brackets are negative since qi = q¯j > argmax [P (Q) qi − Ci(qi)] and
P (nq¯j)−C0i(q¯j) > 0. So, when (12) holds, manager i can not gain by producing
more than q¯j . Now, suppose that (12) holds and that firm i produces qi = q¯j+ε,
with ε < 0. In this case manager i’s payoﬀ is
Ui = (1 + αi) [P (Q) qi − Ci(qi)]−
αi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj − Cj(qj)] ,
and the change in manager i’s payoﬀ from producing qi = q¯j + ε, ε < 0, instead
of q¯j is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1 + αi) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)− C 0i(qi)]−
αi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
qi=q¯j
(ε)
= [(1 + αi) [P (nq¯j)− C0i(q¯j)] + P 0(nq¯j)q¯j ] ε = h(q,αi)|q=q¯j (ε) .
Since ε < 0, we have that sign dUi = −sign h(q,αi)|q=q¯j . If q¯j = q(αi) we have
that sign dUi = 0. If qNi ≤ q¯j < q(αi), the fact h(q,αi) is a decreasing function
of q implies that h(q,αi)|q=q¯j > 0, which in turn implies that sign dUi < 0. So,
when (12) holds, manager i can not gain by producing less than q¯j . From this
result is follows immediately that if firm i’s rivals produce q(αi) < 1n−1
P
j 6=i qj ,
then the best response of manager i is given by ti(q−i).
I will now show that qi = 1n−1
P
j 6=i qj is a best response for manager i when
the rivals produce
q(βi) ≤ q¯j ≤ qNi , (13)
To do that I will show that manager i can not gain from deviating from qi = q¯j
when (13) holds. Suppose, that (13) holds and that firm i produces qi = q¯j + ε,
with ε < 0. In this case manager i’s payoﬀ is given by
Ui = (1 + αi) [P (Q) qi − Ci(qi)]−
αi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj − Cj(qj)] ,
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and the change in manager i’s payoﬀ from producing qi = q¯j + ε, ε < 0, instead
of q¯j is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1 + αi) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)− C 0i(qi)]−
αi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
qi=q¯j
(ε)
= [(1 + αi) [P
0(nq¯j)q¯j + P (nq¯j)− C0i(q¯j)]− αiP 0(nq¯j)q¯j ] ε.
The square brackets are positive since qi = q¯j < argmax [P (Q) qi − Ci(qi)] and
P 0(nq¯j) < 0. So, when (13) holds, manager i can not gain by producing less
than q¯j . Now, suppose that (13) holds and that firm i produces qi = q¯j+ε, with
ε > 0. In this case manager i’s payoﬀ is given by
Ui = (1− βi) [P (Q) qi − Ci(qi)] +
βi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj − Cj(qj)]
and the change in manager i’s payoﬀ from producing qi = q¯j + ε, ε > 0, instead
of q¯j is approximately equal to
dUi ≈ (1− βi) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)− C 0i(qi)] +
βi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
qi=q¯j
(ε)
= [(1− βi) [P (nq¯j)− C0i(q¯j)] + P 0 (nq¯j) q¯j ] ε = g(q,βi)|q=q¯j (ε) .
Since ε > 0, we have that sign dUi = sign g(q,βi)|q=q¯j . If q¯j = q(βi) we have
that sign dUi = 0. If q(βi) < q¯j ≤ qNi , the fact g(q,βi) is a decreasing function
of q implies that g(q,βi)|q=q¯j < 0, which in turn implies that sign dUi < 0. So,
when (13) holds, firm i can not gain by producing more than q¯j . From this result
is follows immediately that if firm i’s rivals produce 0 ≤ 1n−1
P
j 6=i qj < q(βi),
then the best response of manager i is given by si(q−i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: I need to show that qi = qNi is the best re-
sponse to qN−i =
¡
qN1 , . . . , q
N
i−1, q
N
i+1, . . . q
N
n
¢
in the n-firm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse managers. The welfare of man-
ager 1 under outcome qN is given by π1(qN ) =
£
P
¡
nqNi
¢
− Ci(qNi )
¤
qNi , where
qNi = argq1 max
h
P
³
qi +
P
j 6=i q
N
j
´
− Ci(qi)
i
qi.
If firm i produces qNi + ε, with ε > 0, and all other firms produce q
N
−i, then the
change in firm i’s profit is approximately equal to
dπi ≈ ε ∂πi/∂qi|qi=qNi +
1
2
ε2 ∂2πi/∂q2i
¯¯
qi=qNi
=
1
2
ε2
£
2P 0(QN ) + P 00(QN )qNi − C00(qNi )
¤
. (14)
The assumption that P 0 < 0, P 00 ≤ 0, and C00 ≥ 0 imply that dπi < 0. The
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change in the profit of one of firm i’s rivals, say j, is approximately equal to
dπj ≈ ε ∂πj/∂qi|qi=qNi +
1
2
ε2 ∂2πj/∂q2i
¯¯
qi=qNi
= εP 0(QN )qNj +
1
2
ε2P 00(QN )qNj .
Note that the change in the average profit of firm i’s rivals is the same as the
change in the profit of a single rival since
1
n− 1
P
j 6=i
dπj ≈
1
n− 1εP
0(QN)
P
j 6=i
qNj +
1
2
ε2P 00(QN )
P
j 6=i
qNj
= εP 0(QN )qNj +
1
2
ε2P 00(QN )qNj . (15)
The assumption that P 0 < 0 and P 00 ≤ 0 imply that 1n−1
P
j 6=i dπj < 0. We see
from (14) and (15) that if firm i produces qNi +ε, with ε > 0, and all other firms
produce qN−i, then there is a first order decrease in profits of firm i and a second
order decrease in the average profit of firm i’s rivals. Thus, if firm i produces
qNi + ε, with ε > 0, it suﬀers a loss in profits and also a loss from an increase
in inequity aversion given that the average profit of the rivals becomes smaller
than firm i’s profit. If that is the case, then firm i can not gain by producing
qNi + ε, with ε > 0, instead of producing q
N
i .
If firm i produces qNi + ε, with ε < 0, and all other firms produce q
N
−i, then
the change in firm i’s profit is given by (14) and we have that dπi < 0. The
change in the average profit of firm i’s rivals is given by (15) and we have that
1
n−1
P
j 6=i dπj > 0 since ε < 0 and the first term is of first order while the second
term is of second order. Thus, if firm i produces qNi + ε, with ε < 0, it suﬀers a
loss in profits and also a loss from an increase in inequity aversion given that the
average profit of the rivals becomes greater than firm i’s profit. If that is the case,
then firm i can not gain by producing qNi +ε, with ε < 0, instead of producing q
N
i .
This proves that qi = qNi is the best reply to q
N
−i =
¡
qN1 , . . . , q
N
i−1, q
N
i+1, . . . q
N
n
¢
and so qN is a Nash equilibrium of the n-firm symmetric Cournot game with
piecewise linear inequity averse managers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: We know that the set N IA is non-empty since it
contains at least the Nash equilibrium of the standard n-firm symmetric Cournot
game. I need to show that if all managers are strictly averse to inequity, then
q(β) < q(α), that is, N IA is an interval. We know that q(αi) is an increasing
function of αi and that q(βi) is a decreasing function of βi for i = 1, . . . , n. Note
that if at least one manager does not feel inequity aversion then q(β) = q(α), and
N IA is a singleton. To see this suppose that manager i is not inequity averse,
that is, αi = βi = 0. If that is the case, then h(q,αi) = 0 and g(q,βi) = 0 imply
that q(0) = qN . If q(αi) is an increasing function of αi and q(0) = qN , then
q(α) = qN . Similarly, if q(βi) is a decreasing function of βi and q(0) = q
N , then
q(β) = qN . So, if at least one manager feels aversion to inequity we have that
q(β) = q(α) = qN = NIA. I will now show that if all managers are strictly averse
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to inequity, then q(β) < q(α), that is, NIA is an interval. If all managers are
strictly averse to inequity, q(αi) is an increasing function of αi and q(0) = qN ,
then q(α) > qN = q(0). Also, if all managers are strictly inequity averse, q(αi) is
an decreasing function of βi and q(0) = q
N , then q(β) < qN = q(0). This shows
that q(β) < q(α) when all managers are strictly inequity averse, that is the set
N IA is an interval. All outcomes in the set NIA are equilibria of the symmetric
Cournot game with inequity aversion since for any profile of quantities, q−i, the
quantity qi belongs to the best response of firm i, i = 1, . . . n. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: The quantity produced by each firm in the largest
Nash equilibria of N IA is given by q(α) = min [q(α1), . . . , q(αn)] . The largest
Nash equilibria of N IA is nondecreasing in α since min [q(α1), . . . , q(αn)] is
nondecreasing in α. Similarly, the quantity produced by each firm in the smallest
Nash equilibria of NIA is given by q(β) = max [q(β1), . . . , q(βn)] . The smallest
Nash equilibria of N IA is nonincreasing in β since max [q(β1), . . . , q(βn)] is
nonincreasing in β. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: When all managers are strictly averse to inequity
it follows that q(β) < qN < q(α). Since αi is drawn from a uniform distri-
bution with support on [0, 1] , the larger is n the most likely it becomes that
min (α1, . . .αn) is closer to zero, this implies that the larger is n the most likely
is that N(α) is closer to qN . Similarly, since βi is drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution with support on [0, 1] , the larger is n the most likely it becomes that
min (β1, . . . ,βn) is closer to zero, this implies that the larger is n the most likely
is that N(β) is closer to qN . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: If marginal costs are constant, then we have
Ci(qi) = cqi, i = 1, . . . , n. The payoﬀ of manager i in the presence of piecewise
linear inequity aversion is given by
Ui (pi, p−i) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− βi) (pi − c)D(pi), if pi < pminj³
1− βi + βi l−1n−1
´
(pi−c)D(pi)
l , if pj ≥ pi, ∀j ∈ N
−αi
¡
pminj − c
¢
D(pminj ), if pi > p
min
j
,
where pminj = min (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn) and l = # {j ∈ N : pj = pi} . For
manager i not to deviate from an equilibrium where firm i plus l−1 firms charge
p ∈ (c, p¯] and the remaining firms charge a higher price than p it must be that
(1− βi) (pi − c)D(pi) ≤
µ
1− βi + βi
l − 1
n− 1
¶
(pi − c)D(pi)
l
or 1− 1n ≤ βi. For all managers not to deviate, the case when l = n, from such
an equilibrium we need that 1 − 1n ≤ min (β1, . . . ,βn) . If this condition does
not hold, then there is at least one manager that is always willing to undercut
a price p ∈ (c, p¯] . If that is the case, then the only equilibrium is for all firms to
charge price equal to marginal cost. Q.E.D.
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